

# INTERNATIONAL STANDARD

**ISO**  
**26262-1**

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## **Road vehicles — Functional safety —** **Part 1:** **Vocabulary**

*Véhicules routiers — Sécurité fonctionnelle —*  
*Partie 1: Vocabulaire*



Reference number  
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## Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of electrotechnical standardization.

International Standards are drafted in accordance with the rules given in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The main task of technical committees is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards adopted by the technical committees are circulated to the member bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the member bodies casting a vote.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

ISO 26262-1 was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 22, *Road vehicles*, Subcommittee SC 3, *Electrical and electronic equipment*.

ISO 26262 consists of the following parts, under the general title *Road vehicles — Functional safety*:

- *Part 1: Vocabulary*
- *Part 2: Management of functional safety*
- *Part 3: Concept phase*
- *Part 4: Product development at the system level*
- *Part 5: Product development at the hardware level*
- *Part 6: Product development at the software level*
- Part 7: Production and operation*
- Part 8: Supporting processes*
- Part 9: Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL)-oriented and safety-oriented analyses*
- Part 10: Guideline on ISO 26262*

## Introduction

ISO 26262 is the adaptation of IEC 61508 to comply with needs specific to the application sector of electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems within road vehicles.

This adaptation applies to all activities during the safety lifecycle of safety-related systems comprised of electrical, electronic and software components.

Safety is one of the key issues of future automobile development. New functionalities not only in areas such as driver assistance, propulsion, in vehicle dynamics control and active and passive safety systems increasingly touch the domain of system safety engineering. Development and integration of these functionalities will strengthen the need for safe system development processes and the need to provide evidence that all reasonable system safety objectives are satisfied.

With the trend of increasing technological complexity, software content and mechatronic implementation, there are increasing risks from systematic failures and random hardware failures. ISO 26262 includes guidance to avoid these risks by providing appropriate requirements and processes.

System safety is achieved through a number of safety measures, which are implemented in a variety of technologies (e.g. mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, electrical, electronic, programmable electronic) and applied at the various levels of the development process. Although ISO 26262 is concerned with functional safety of E/E systems, it provides a framework within which safety-related systems based on other technologies can be considered. ISO 26262:

- a) provides an automotive safety lifecycle (management, development, production, operation, service, decommissioning) and supports tailoring the necessary activities during these lifecycle phases;
- b) provides an automotive-specific risk-based approach to determine integrity levels [Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASIL)];
- c) uses ASILs to specify applicable requirements of ISO 26262 so as to avoid unreasonable residual risk;
- d) provides requirements for validation and confirmation measures to ensure a sufficient and acceptable level of safety being achieved;
- e) provides requirements for relations with suppliers.

Functional safety is influenced by the development process (including such activities as requirements specification, design, implementation, integration, verification, validation and configuration), the production and service processes and by the management processes.

Safety issues are intertwined with common function-oriented and quality-oriented development activities and work products. ISO 26262 addresses the safety-related aspects of development activities and work products.

Figure 1 shows the overall structure of this edition of ISO 26262. ISO 26262 is based upon a V-model as a reference process model for the different phases of product development. Within the figure:

- the shaded “V”s represent the interconnection between ISO 26262-3, ISO 26262-4, ISO 26262-5, ISO 26262-6 and ISO 26262-7;
- the specific clauses are indicated in the following manner: “m-n”, where “m” represents the number of the particular part and “n” indicates the number of the clause within that part.

EXAMPLE “2-6” represents Clause 6 of ISO 26262-2.




Figure 1 — Overview of ISO 26262

# Road vehicles — Functional safety —

## Part 1: Vocabulary

### Scope

ISO 26262 is intended to be applied to safety-related systems that include one or more electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems and that are installed in series production passenger cars with a maximum gross vehicle mass up to 3 500 kg. ISO 26262 does not address unique E/E systems in special purpose vehicles such as vehicles designed for drivers with disabilities.

Systems and their components released for production, or systems and their components already under development prior to the publication date of ISO 26262, are exempted from the scope. For further development or alterations based on systems and their components released for production prior to the publication of ISO 26262, only the modifications will be developed in accordance with ISO 26262.

ISO 26262 addresses possible hazards caused by malfunctioning behaviour of E/E safety-related systems, including interaction of these systems. It does not address hazards related to electric shock, fire, smoke, heat, radiation, toxicity, flammability, reactivity, corrosion, release of energy and similar hazards, unless directly caused by malfunctioning behaviour of E/E safety-related systems.

ISO 26262 does not address the nominal performance of E/E systems, even if dedicated functional performance standards exist for these systems (e.g. active and passive safety systems, brake systems, Adaptive Cruise Control).

This part of ISO 26262 specifies the terms, definitions and abbreviated terms for application in all parts of ISO 26262.

## 1 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

### 1.1

#### **allocation**

assignment of a requirement to an architectural **element** (1.32)

NOTE Intent is not to divide an atomic requirement into multiple requirements. Tracing of an atomic **system** (1.129) level requirement to multiple lower level atomic requirements is allowed.

### 1.2

#### **anomaly**

condition that deviates from expectations, based, for example, on requirements, specifications, design documents, user documents, standards, or on experience

NOTE Anomalies can be discovered, among other times, during the **review** (1.98), **testing** (1.134), analysis, compilation, or use of **components** (1.15) or applicable documentation.

### **1.3 architecture**

representation of the structure of the **item** (1.69) or functions or **systems** (1.129) or **elements** (1.32) that allows identification of building blocks, their boundaries and interfaces, and includes the **allocation** (1.1) of functions to hardware and software elements

### **1.4 assessment**

examination of a characteristic of an **item** (1.69) or **element** (1.32)

NOTE A level of **independence** (1.61) of the party or parties performing the assessment is associated with each assessment.

### **1.5 audit**

examination of an implemented process

### **1.6 Automotive Safety Integrity Level ASIL**

one of four levels to specify the **item's** (1.69) or **element's** (1.32) necessary requirements of ISO 26262 and **safety measures** (1.110) to apply for avoiding an unreasonable **residual risk** (1.97), with D representing the most stringent and A the least stringent level

### **1.7 ASIL decomposition**

apportioning of safety requirements redundantly to sufficiently independent **elements** (1.32), with the objective of reducing the **ASIL** (1.6) of the redundant safety requirements that are allocated to the corresponding elements

### **1.8 availability**

capability of a product to be in a state to execute the function required under given conditions, at a certain time or in a given period, supposing the required external resources are available

### **1.9 baseline**

version of a set of one or more work products, **items** (1.69) or **elements** (1.32) that is under configuration management and used as a basis for further development through the change management process

NOTE See ISO 26262-8:2011, Clause 8.

### **1.10 branch coverage**

percentage of branches of the control flow that have been executed

NOTE 1 100 % branch coverage implies 100 % **statement coverage** (1.127).

NOTE 2 An if-statement always has two branches - condition true and condition false - independent of the existence of an else-clause.

### **1.11 calibration data**

data that will be applied after the software build in the development process

EXAMPLE Parameters (e.g. value for low idle speed, engine characteristic diagrams); vehicle specific parameters (adaptation values) (e.g. limit stop for throttle valve); variant coding (e.g. country code, left-hand/right-hand steering).

NOTE Calibration data cannot contain executable or interpretable code.



**1.12****candidate**

**item** (1.69) or **element** (1.32) whose definition and conditions of use are identical to, or have a very high degree of commonality with, an item or element that is already released and in operation

NOTE This definition applies where candidate is used in the context of a **proven in use argument** (1.90).

**1.13****cascading failure**

**failure** (1.39) of an **element** (1.32) of an **item** (1.69) causing another element or elements of the same item to fail

NOTE Cascading failures are **dependent failures** (1.22) that are not **common cause failures** (1.14). See Figure 2, Failure A.



Figure 2 — Cascading failure

**1.14****common cause failure****CCF**

**failure** (1.39) of two or more **elements** (1.32) of an **item** (1.69) resulting from a single specific event or root cause

NOTE Common cause failures are **dependent failures** (1.22) that are not **cascading failures** (1.13). See Figure 3.




Figure 3 — Common cause failure

**1.15****component**

non-**system** (1.129) level **element** (1.32) that is logically and technically separable and is comprised of more than one **hardware part** (1.55) or of one or more **software units** (1.125)

NOTE A component is a part of a system.

**1.16****configuration data**

data that is assigned during software build and that controls the software build process

EXAMPLE Pre-processor instructions; software build scripts (e.g. XML configuration files).

NOTE 1 Configuration data cannot contain executable or interpretable code.

NOTE 2 Configuration data controls the software build. Only code, or data selected by configuration data can be included in the executable code.

### 1.17

#### **confirmation measure**

**confirmation review** (1.18), **audit** (1.5) or **assessment** (1.4) concerning **functional safety** (1.51)

### 1.18

#### **confirmation review**

confirmation that a work product meets the requirements of ISO 26262 with the required level of **independence** (1.61) of the reviewer

NOTE 1 A complete list of confirmation reviews is given in ISO 26262-2.

NOTE 2 The goal of confirmation reviews is to ensure compliance with ISO 26262.

### 1.19

#### **controllability**

ability to avoid a specified **harm** (1.56) or damage through the timely reactions of the persons involved, possibly with support from **external measures** (1.38)

NOTE 1 Persons involved can include the driver, passengers or persons in the vicinity of the vehicle's exterior.

NOTE 2 The parameter C in **hazard analysis and risk assessment** (1.58) represents the potential for controllability.

### 1.20

#### **dedicated measure**

measure to ensure the **failure rate** (1.41) claimed in the evaluation of the probability of violation of **safety goals** (1.108)

EXAMPLE Design feature [such as **hardware part** (1.55) over-design (e.g. electrical or thermal stress rating) or physical separation (e.g. spacing of contacts on a printed circuit board)]; special sample test of incoming material to reduce the **risk** (1.99) of occurrence of **failure modes** (1.40) which contribute to the violation of safety goals; burn-in test; dedicated control plan.

### 1.21

#### **degradation**

strategy for providing **safety** (1.103) by design after the occurrence of **failures** (1.39)

NOTE Degradation can include reduced functionality, reduced performance, or both reduced functionality and performance.

### 1.22

#### **dependent failures**

**failures** (1.39) whose probability of simultaneous or successive occurrence cannot be expressed as the simple product of the unconditional probabilities of each of them

NOTE 1 Dependent failures A and B can be characterized when

$$P_{AB} \neq P_A \times P_B$$

where

$P_{AB}$  is the probability of the simultaneous occurrence of failure A and failure B;

$P_A$  is the probability of the occurrence of failure A;

$P_B$  is the probability of the occurrence of failure B.

NOTE 2 Dependent failures include **common cause failures** (1.14) and **cascading failures** (1.13).

**1.23****detected fault**

**fault** (1.42) whose presence is detected within a prescribed time by a **safety mechanism** (1.111) that prevents the fault from being latent

EXAMPLE The fault can be detected by a dedicated **safety mechanism** (1.111) (e.g. detection of the **error** (1.36) and notifying the driver via an alerting device on the instrument panel) as defined in the **functional safety concept** (1.52).

**1.24****development interface agreement****DIA**

agreement between customer and supplier in which the responsibilities for activities, evidence or work products to be exchanged by each party are specified

**1.25****diagnostic coverage**

proportion of the hardware **element** (1.32) **failure rate** (1.41) that is detected or controlled by the implemented **safety mechanisms** (1.111)

NOTE 1 Diagnostic coverage can be assessed with regard to **residual faults** (1.96) or with regard to latent **multiple-point faults** (1.77) that might occur in a hardware element.

NOTE 2 The definition can be represented in terms of the equations given in ISO 26262-5.

NOTE 3 Safety mechanisms implemented at different levels in the **architecture** (1.3) can be considered.

**1.26****diagnostic test interval**

amount of time between the executions of online diagnostic tests by a **safety mechanism** (1.111)

**1.27****distributed development**

development of an **item** (1.69) or **element** (1.32) with development responsibility divided between the customer and supplier(s) for the entire item or element, or for subsystems

NOTE Customer and supplier are roles of the cooperating parties.

**1.28****diversity**

different solutions satisfying the same requirement with the aim of **independence** (1.61)

EXAMPLE Diverse programming; diverse hardware.

NOTE Diversity does not guarantee independence, but addresses certain types of **common cause failures** (1.14).

**1.29****dual-point failure**

**failure** (1.39) resulting from the combination of two independent **faults** (1.42) that leads directly to the violation of a **safety goal** (1.108)

NOTE 1 Dual-point failures are **multiple-point failures** (1.76) of order 2.

NOTE 2 Dual-point failures that are addressed in ISO 26262 include those where one fault affects a **safety-related element** (1.113) and another fault affects the corresponding **safety mechanism** (1.111) intended to achieve or maintain a **safe state** (1.102).

NOTE 3 For a dual-point failure to directly violate a safety goal, the presence of both independent faults is necessary, i.e. the violation of a safety goal due to a combination of a **residual fault** (1.96) with a **safe fault** (1.101) is not considered a dual-point failure since the residual fault leads to a violation of a safety goal with or without the presence of a second independent fault.

### 1.30

#### **dual-point fault**

individual **fault** (1.42) that, in combination with another independent fault, leads to a **dual-point failure** (1.29)

NOTE 1 A dual-point fault can only be recognized after the identification of dual-point failure, e.g. from cut set analysis of a fault tree.

NOTE 2 See also **multiple-point fault** (1.77).

### 1.31

#### **electrical and/or electronic system E/E system**

**system** (1.129) that consists of electrical and/or electronic **elements** (1.32), including programmable electronic elements

EXAMPLE Power supply; sensor or other input device; communication path; actuator or other output device.

### 1.32

#### **element**

**system** (1.129) or part of a system including **components** (1.15), hardware, software, **hardware parts** (1.55), and **software units** (1.125)

### 1.33

#### **embedded software**

fully-integrated software to be executed on a processing **element** (1.32)

NOTE The processing element is normally a micro-controller, a field programmable gate array (FPGA) or an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), but it can also be a more complex **component** (1.15) or subsystem.

### 1.34

#### **emergency operation**

degraded functionality from the state in which a **fault** (1.42) occurred until the transition to a **safe state** (1.102) is achieved as defined in the **warning and degradation concept** (1.140)

### 1.35

#### **emergency operation interval**

specified time-span that **emergency operation** (1.34) is needed to support the **warning and degradation concept** (1.140)

NOTE Emergency operation is part of the **warning and degradation concept** (1.140).

### 1.36

#### **error**

discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition, and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition

NOTE 1 An error can arise as a result of unforeseen operating conditions or due to a **fault** (1.42) within the **system** (1.129), subsystem or **component** (1.15) being considered.

NOTE 2 A fault can manifest itself as an error within the considered **element** (1.32) and the error can ultimately cause a **failure** (1.39).

### 1.37

#### **exposure**

state of being in an **operational situation** (1.83) that can be **hazardous** (1.57) if coincident with the **failure mode** (1.40) under analysis

### 1.38

#### **external measure**

measure that is separate and distinct from the **item** (1.69) which reduces or mitigates the **risks** (1.99) resulting from the item

### 1.39 failure

termination of the ability of an **element** (1.32), to perform a function as required

NOTE Incorrect specification is a source of failure.

### 1.40 failure mode

manner in which an **element** (1.32) or an **item** (1.69) fails

### 1.41 failure rate

probability density of **failure** (1.39) divided by probability of survival for a hardware **element** (1.32)

NOTE The failure rate is assumed to be constant and is generally denoted as " $\lambda$ ".

### 1.42 fault

abnormal condition that can cause an **element** (1.32) or an **item** (1.69) to fail

NOTE 1 Permanent, intermittent and **transient faults** (1.134) (especially soft-errors) are considered.

NOTE 2 An intermittent fault occurs time and time again, then disappears. This type of fault can occur when a **component** (1.15) is on the verge of breaking down or, for example, due to a glitch in a switch. Some **systematic faults** (1.131) (e.g. timing marginalities) could lead to intermittent faults.

### 1.43 fault model

representation of **failure modes** (1.40) resulting from **faults** (1.42)

NOTE Fault models are generally based on field experience or reliability handbooks.

### 1.44 fault reaction time

time-span from the detection of a **fault** (1.42) to reaching the **safe state** (1.102)

See Figure 4.




Figure 4 — Fault reaction time and fault tolerant time interval

#### 1.45

##### **fault tolerant time interval**

time-span in which a **fault** (1.42) or faults can be present in a **system** (1.129) before a **hazardous** (1.57) event occurs

#### 1.46

##### **field data**

data obtained from the use of an **item** (1.69) or **element** (1.32) including cumulative operating hours, all **failures** (1.39) and in-service anomalies

NOTE Field data normally comes from customer use.

#### 1.47

##### **formal notation**

description technique that has both its syntax and semantics completely defined

EXAMPLE Z notation (Zed); NuSMV (symbolic model checker); Prototype Verification System (PVS); Vienna Development Method (VDM).

#### 1.48

##### **formal verification**

method used to prove the correctness of a **system** (1.129) against the specification in **formal notation** (1.47) of its required behaviour

#### 1.49

##### **freedom from interference**

absence of **cascading failures** (1.13) between two or more **elements** (1.32) that could lead to the violation of a safety requirement

EXAMPLE 1 Element 1 is free of interference from element 2 if no **failure** (1.39) of element 2 can cause element 1 to fail.

EXAMPLE 2 Element 3 interferes with element 4 if there exists a failure of element 3 that causes element 4 to fail.

#### 1.50

##### **functional concept**

specification of the intended functions and their interactions necessary to achieve the desired behaviour

NOTE The functional concept is developed during the concept **phase** (1.89).

#### 1.51

##### **functional safety**

absence of **unreasonable risk** (1.136) due to **hazards** (1.57) caused by **malfunctioning behaviour** (1.73) of **E/E systems** (1.31)

#### 1.52

##### **functional safety concept**

specification of the **functional safety requirements** (1.53), with associated information, their **allocation** (1.1) to architectural **elements** (1.32), and their interaction necessary to achieve the **safety goals** (1.108)

#### 1.53

##### **functional safety requirement**

specification of implementation-independent **safety** (1.103) behaviour, or implementation-independent **safety measure** (1.110), including its safety-related attributes

NOTE 1 A functional safety requirement can be a safety requirement implemented by a safety-related **E/E system** (1.31), or by a safety-related **system** (1.129) of **other technologies** (1.84), in order to achieve or maintain a **safe state** (1.102) for the **item** (1.69) taking into account a determined **hazardous event** (1.59).

NOTE 2 The functional safety requirements might be specified independently of the technology used in the concept **phase** (1.89), of product development.

NOTE 3 Safety-related attributes include information about **ASIL** (1.6).

#### 1.54

##### **hardware architectural metrics**

metrics for the **assessment** (1.4) of the effectiveness of the hardware **architecture** (1.3) with respect to **safety** (1.103)

NOTE The **single-point fault** (1.122) metric and the **latent fault** (1.71) metric are the hardware architectural metrics.

#### 1.55

##### **hardware part**

hardware which cannot be subdivided

#### 1.56

##### **harm**

physical injury or damage to the health of persons

#### 1.57

##### **hazard**

potential source of **harm** (1.56) caused by **malfunctioning behaviour** (1.73) of the **item** (1.69)

NOTE This definition is restricted to the scope of ISO 26262; a more general definition is potential source of harm.

#### 1.58

##### **hazard analysis and risk assessment**

method to identify and categorize **hazardous events** (1.59) of **items** (1.69) and to specify **safety goals** (1.108) and **ASILs** (1.6) related to the prevention or mitigation of the associated hazards in order to avoid **unreasonable risk** (1.136)

#### 1.59

##### **hazardous event**

combination of a **hazard** (1.57) and an **operational situation** (1.83)

#### 1.60

##### **homogeneous redundancy**

multiple but identical implementations of a requirement

#### 1.61

##### **independence**

absence of **dependent failures** (1.22) between two or more **elements** (1.32) that could lead to the violation of a safety requirement, or organizational separation of the parties performing an action

NOTE By definition, **ASIL decomposition** (1.7) or **confirmation measures** (1.17) include requirements on independence.

#### 1.62

##### **independent failures**

**failures** (1.39) whose probability of simultaneous or successive occurrence can be expressed as the simple product of their unconditional probabilities

#### 1.63

##### **informal notation**

description technique that does not have its syntax completely defined

EXAMPLE Description in figure or diagram.

NOTE An incomplete syntax definition implies that the semantics are also not completely defined.

#### 1.64

##### **informal verification**

**verification** (1.137) methods not considered as semi-formal or **formal verification** (1.48) techniques

EXAMPLE Design **review** (1.98); model review.

### 1.65

#### **inheritance**

passing attributes of requirements in an unchanged manner to the next level of detail during the development process

### 1.66

#### **initial ASIL**

**ASIL** (1.6) resulting from the hazard analysis or the ASIL resulting from a preceding **ASIL decomposition** (1.7)

NOTE The initial ASIL is the starting point for **ASIL decomposition** (1.7) or further ASIL decomposition.

### 1.67

#### **inspection**

examination of work products, following a formal procedure, in order to detect anomalies

NOTE 1 Inspection is a means of **verification** (1.137).

NOTE 2 Inspection differs from **testing** (1.134) in that it does not normally involve the operation of the associated **item** (1.69) or **element** (1.32).

NOTE 3 Any anomalies that are detected are usually addressed by rework, followed by re-inspection of the reworked products.

NOTE 4 A formal procedure normally includes a previously defined procedure, checklist, moderator and **review** (1.98) of the results.

### 1.68

#### **intended functionality**

behaviour specified for an **item** (1.69), **system** (1.129), or **element** (1.32) excluding **safety mechanisms** (1.111)

### 1.69

#### **item**

**system** (1.129) or array of systems to implement a function at the vehicle level, to which ISO 26262 is applied

### 1.70

#### **item development**

complete process of implementing an **item** (1.69)

### 1.71

#### **latent fault**

**multiple-point fault** (1.77) whose presence is not detected by a **safety mechanism** (1.111) nor perceived by the driver within the **multiple-point fault detection interval** (1.78)

### 1.72

#### **lifecycle**

entirety of **phases** (1.89) from concept through decommissioning of the **item** (1.69)

### 1.73

#### **malfunctioning behaviour**

**failure** (1.39) or unintended behaviour of an **item** (1.69) with respect to its design intent

### 1.74

#### **model-based development**

development that uses models to describe the functional behaviour of the **elements** (1.32) to be developed

NOTE Depending on the level of abstraction used for such a model, the model can be used for simulation or code generation or both.



**1.75****modification**

authorized alteration of an **item** (1.69)

NOTE 1 Modification is used in ISO 26262 with respect to re-use for **lifecycle** (1.72) tailoring.

NOTE 2 A change is applied during the lifecycle of an item, while a modification is applied to create a new item from an existing item.

**1.76****multiple-point failure**

**failure** (1.39), resulting from the combination of several independent **faults** (1.42), which leads directly to the violation of a **safety goal** (1.108)

NOTE For a multiple-point failure to directly violate a safety goal, the presence of all independent faults is necessary, i.e. the violation of a safety goal due to a combination of a **residual fault** (1.96) with other independent faults is not considered a multiple-point failure.

**1.77****multiple-point fault**

individual **fault** (1.42) that, in combination with other independent faults, leads to a **multiple-point failure** (1.76)

NOTE A multiple-point fault can only be recognized after the identification of multiple-point failure, e.g. from cut set analysis of a fault tree.

**1.78****multiple-point fault detection interval**

time span to **detect multiple-point fault** (1.77) before it can contribute to a **multiple-point failure** (1.76)

See Figure 4.

**1.79****new development**

process of creating an **item** (1.69) having previously unspecified functionality, a novel implementation of an existing functionality, or both

**1.80****non-functional hazard**

**hazard** (1.57) that arises due to factors other than incorrect functioning of the **E/E system** (1.31), safety-related **systems** (1.129) of **other technologies** (1.84), or **external measures** (1.38)

**1.81****operating mode**

perceivable functional state of an **item** (1.69) or **element** (1.32)

EXAMPLE **System** (1.129) off; system active; system passive; degraded operation; **emergency operation** (1.34).

**1.82****operating time**

cumulative time that an **item** (1.69) or **element** (1.32) is functioning

**1.83****operational situation**

scenario that can occur during a vehicle's life

EXAMPLE Driving; parking; maintenance.

#### 1.84

##### **other technology**

technology different from E/E technologies within the scope of ISO 26262

EXAMPLE Mechanical technology; hydraulic technology.

NOTE Other technologies can either be considered in the specification of the **functional safety concept** (1.52) (see ISO 26262-3:2011, Clause 8 and Figure 2), during the **allocation** (1.1) of safety requirements (see ISO 26262-3 and ISO 26262-4), or as an **external measure** (1.38).

#### 1.85

##### **partitioning**

separation of functions or **elements** (1.32) to achieve a design

NOTE Partitioning can be used for **fault** (1.42) containment to avoid **cascading failures** (1.13). To achieve **freedom from interference** (1.49) between partitioned design elements, additional non-functional requirements can be introduced.

#### 1.86

##### **passenger car**

vehicle designed and constructed primarily for the carriage of persons and their luggage, their goods, or both, having not more than a seating capacity of eight, in addition to the driver, and without space for standing passengers

#### 1.87

##### **perceived fault**

**fault** (1.42) whose presence is deduced by the driver within a prescribed time interval

EXAMPLE The fault can be directly perceived through obvious limitation of **system** (1.129) behaviour or performance.

#### 1.88

##### **permanent fault**

**fault** (1.42) that occurs and stays until removed or repaired

NOTE Direct current (d.c.) faults, e.g. stuck-at and bridging faults, are permanent faults. **Systematic faults** (1.131) manifest themselves mainly as permanent faults.

#### 1.89

##### **phase**

stage in the safety **lifecycle** (1.72) that is specified in a distinct part of ISO 26262

NOTE The phases in ISO 26262 are specified in distinct parts, i.e. ISO 26262-3, ISO 26262-4, ISO 26262-5, ISO 26262-6 and ISO 26262-7 specify, respectively, the phases of:

- concept,
- product development at the system level,
- product development at the hardware level,
- product development at the software level, and
- production and operation.

#### 1.90

##### **proven in use argument**

evidence, based on analysis of **field data** (1.46) resulting from use of a **candidate** (1.12), that the probability of any **failure** (1.39) of this candidate that could impair a **safety goal** (1.108) of an **item** (1.69) that uses it meets the requirements for the applicable **ASIL** (1.6)

#### 1.91

##### **proven in use credit**

substitution of a given set of **lifecycle** (1.72) **subphases** (1.128) with corresponding work products by a **proven in use argument** (1.90)

**1.92****random hardware failure**

**failure** (1.39) that can occur unpredictably during the lifetime of a hardware **element** (1.32) and that follows a probability distribution

NOTE Random hardware **failure rates** (1.41) can be predicted with reasonable accuracy.

**1.93****reasonably foreseeable event**

event that is technically possible and has a credible or measurable rate of occurrence

**1.94****redundancy**

existence of means in addition to the means that would be sufficient for an **element** (1.32) to perform a required function or to represent information

NOTE Redundancy is used in ISO 26262 with respect to achieving a **safety goal** (1.108) or a specified safety requirement, or to representing safety-related information.

EXAMPLE 1 Duplicated functional **components** (1.15) can be an instance of redundancy for the purpose of increasing **availability** (1.8) or allowing **fault** (1.42) detection.

EXAMPLE 2 The addition of parity bits to data representing safety-related information provides redundancy for the purpose of allowing fault detection.

**1.95****regression strategy**

strategy to verify that an implemented change did not affect the unchanged, existing and previously verified parts or properties of an **item** (1.69) or an **element** (1.32)

**1.96****residual fault**

portion of a **fault** (1.42) that by itself leads to the violation of a **safety goal** (1.108), occurring in a hardware **element** (1.32), where that portion of the fault is not covered by **safety mechanisms** (1.111)

NOTE This presumes that the hardware element has safety mechanism coverage for only a portion of its faults.

EXAMPLE If low (60 %) coverage is claimed for a **failure mode** (1.40), the other 40 % of that same failure mode is the residual fault.

**1.97****residual risk**

**risk** (1.99) remaining after the deployment of **safety measures** (1.110)

**1.98****review**

examination of a work product, for achievement of the intended work product goal, according to the purpose of the review

NOTE Reviews can be supported by checklists.

**1.99****risk**

combination of the probability of occurrence of **harm** (1.56) and the **severity** (1.120) of that harm

**1.100****robust design**

design that has the ability to function correctly in the presence of invalid inputs or stressful environmental conditions

## ISO 26262-1:2011(E)

NOTE Robustness can be understood as follows:

- for software, robustness is the ability to respond to abnormal inputs and conditions;
- for hardware, robustness is the ability to be immune to environmental stress and stable over the service life within design limits;
- in the context of ISO 26262, robustness is the ability to provide safe behaviour at boundaries.

### 1.101

#### **safe fault**

**fault** (1.42) whose occurrence will not significantly increase the probability of violation of a **safety goal** (1.108)

NOTE 1 As shown in ISO 26262-5:2011, Annex B, both non-safety and **safety-related elements** (1.113) can have safe faults.

NOTE 2 **Single-point faults** (1.122), **residual faults** (1.96) and dual-point faults do not constitute safe faults.

NOTE 3 Unless shown relevant in the safety concept, **multiple-point faults** (1.77) with higher order than 2 can be considered as safe faults.

### 1.102

#### **safe state**

**operating mode** (1.81) of an **item** (1.69) without an unreasonable level of **risk** (1.99)

EXAMPLE Intended operating mode; degraded operating mode; switched-off mode.

### 1.103

#### **safety**

absence of **unreasonable risk** (1.136)

### 1.104

#### **safety activity**

activity performed in one or more **subphases** (1.128) of the safety **lifecycle** (1.72)

### 1.105

#### **safety architecture**

set of **elements** (1.32) and their interaction to fulfil the safety requirements

### 1.106

#### **safety case**

argument that the safety requirements for an **item** (1.69) are complete and satisfied by evidence compiled from work products of the safety activities during development

NOTE Safety case can be extended to cover **safety** (1.103) issues beyond the scope of ISO 26262.

### 1.107

#### **safety culture**

policy and strategy used within an organization to support the development, production and operation of safety-related systems (1.129)

NOTE See ISO 26262-2:2011, Annex B.

### 1.108

#### **safety goal**

top-level safety requirement as a result of the **hazard analysis and risk assessment** (1.58)

NOTE One safety goal can be related to several **hazards** (1.57), and several safety goals can be related to a single hazard.

**1.109****safety manager**

role filled by the person responsible for the **functional safety** (1.51) management during the **item** (1.69) development

**1.110****safety measure**

activity or technical solution to avoid or control **systematic failures** (1.130) and to detect **random hardware failures** (1.92) or control random hardware failures, or mitigate their harmful effects

NOTE 1 Examples of safety measures are FMEA and software without the use of global variables.

NOTE 2 Safety measures include **safety mechanisms** (1.111).

**1.111****safety mechanism**

technical solution implemented by E/E functions or **elements** (1.32), or by **other technologies** (1.84), to detect **faults** (1.42) or control **failures** (1.39) in order to achieve or maintain a **safe state** (1.102)

NOTE 1 Safety mechanisms are implemented within the **item** (1.69) to prevent faults from leading to **single-point failures** (1.121) or to reduce residual failures and to prevent faults from being latent.

NOTE 2 The safety mechanism is either

- a) able to transition to, or maintain, the item in a safe state, or
- b) able to alert the driver such that the driver is expected to control the effect of the **failure** (1.39),

as defined in the **functional safety concept** (1.52).

**1.112****safety plan**

plan to manage and guide the execution of the **safety activities** (1.104) of a project including dates, milestones, tasks, deliverables, responsibilities and resources

**1.113****safety-related element**

**element** (1.32) that has the potential to contribute to the violation of or achievement of a **safety goal** (1.108)

NOTE Fail-safe elements are considered safety-related if they can contribute to at least one safety goal.

**1.114****safety-related function**

function that has the potential to contribute to the violation of a **safety goal** (1.108)

**1.115****safety-related special characteristic**

characteristic of an **item** (1.69) or an **element** (1.32), or else their production process, for which reasonably foreseeable deviation could impact, contribute to, or cause any potential reduction of **functional safety** (1.51)

NOTE 1 Term special characteristics are defined in ISO/TS 16949.

NOTE 2 Safety-related special characteristics are derived during the development **phase** (1.89) of the item or the elements.

EXAMPLE Temperature range; expiration date; fastening torque; production tolerance; configuration.

**1.116****safety validation**

assurance, based on examination and tests, that the **safety goals** (1.108) are sufficient and have been achieved

NOTE ISO 26262-4 provides suitable methods for validation.

### 1.117

#### **semi-formal notation**

description technique whose syntax is completely defined but whose semantics definition can be incomplete

EXAMPLE System Analysis and Design Techniques (SADT); Unified Modeling Language (UML).

### 1.118

#### **semi-formal verification**

verification (1.137) that is based on a description given in **semi-formal notation** (1.117)

EXAMPLE Use of test vectors generated from a semi-formal model to test that the **system** (1.129) behaviour matches the model.

### 1.119

#### **service note**

documentation of **safety** (1.103) information to be considered when performing maintenance procedures for the **item** (1.69)

EXAMPLE **Safety-related special characteristic** (1.115); safety operation that can be required.

### 1.120

#### **severity**

estimate of the extent of **harm** (1.56) to one or more individuals that can occur in a potentially **hazardous** (1.57) situation

NOTE The parameter "S" in **hazard analysis and risk assessment** (1.58) represents the potential severity of harm.

### 1.121

#### **single-point failure**

**failure** (1.39) that results from a **single-point fault** (1.122) and that leads directly to the violation of a **safety goal** (1.108)

NOTE 1 A single-point failure is equivalent to a residual failure for an **element** (1.32) with 0 % **diagnostic coverage** (1.25).

NOTE 2 If at least one **safety mechanism** (1.111) is defined for an HW element (e.g. a watchdog for a microcontroller), then no **faults** (1.42) of the considered hardware element are single-point faults.

### 1.122

#### **single-point fault**

**fault** (1.42) in an **element** (1.32) that is not covered by a **safety mechanism** (1.111) and that leads directly to the violation of a **safety goal** (1.108)

NOTE See also **single-point failure** (1.121).

### 1.123

#### **software component**

one or more **software units** (1.125)

### 1.124

#### **software tool**

computer program used in the development of an **item** (1.69) or **element** (1.32)

### 1.125

#### **software unit**

atomic level **software component** (1.123) of the software **architecture** (1.3) that can be subjected to stand-alone **testing** (1.134)

### 1.126

#### **special-purpose vehicle**

vehicle intended to perform a function that requires special body arrangements, equipment or both

EXAMPLE Motor caravan; armoured vehicle; ambulance; hearse; trailer caravan; mobile crane.

NOTE ECE TRANS/WP.29/78/Rev.1/Amend.2 provides definitions for special-purpose vehicles.

### 1.127

#### **statement coverage**

percentage of statements within the software that have been executed

### 1.128

#### **subphase**

subdivision of a stage in the safety **lifecycle** (1.72) that is specified in a distinct clause of ISO 26262

EXAMPLE **Hazard analysis and risk assessment** (1.58) is a subphase of the safety lifecycle specified in ISO 26262-3:2011, Clause 7.

### 1.129

#### **system**

set of **elements** (1.32) that relates at least a sensor, a controller and an actuator with one another

NOTE 1 The related sensor or actuator can be included in the system, or can be external to the system.

NOTE 2 An element of a system can also be another system.

### 1.130

#### **systematic failure**

**failure** (1.39), related in a deterministic way to a certain cause, that can only be eliminated by a change of the design or of the manufacturing process, operational procedures, documentation or other relevant factors

### 1.131

#### **systematic fault**

**fault** (1.42) whose **failure** (1.39) is manifested in a deterministic way that can only be prevented by applying process or design measures

### 1.132

#### **technical safety concept**

specification of the **technical safety requirements** (1.133) and their **allocation** (1.1) to **system** (1.129) **elements** (1.32) for implementation by the system design

### 1.133

#### **technical safety requirement**

requirement derived for implementation of associated **functional safety requirements** (1.53)

NOTE The derived requirement includes requirements for mitigation.

### 1.134

#### **testing**

process of planning, preparing, and operating or exercising an **item** (1.69) or an **element** (1.32) to verify that it satisfies specified requirements, to detect **anomalies** (1.2), and to create confidence in its behaviour

### 1.135

#### **transient fault**

**fault** (1.42) that occurs once and subsequently disappears

NOTE Transient faults can appear due to electromagnetic interference, which can lead to bit-flips. Soft errors such as Single Event Upset (SEU) and Single Event Transient (SET) are transient faults.

**1.136**

**unreasonable risk**

**risk** (1.99) judged to be unacceptable in a certain context according to valid societal moral concepts

**1.137**

**verification**

determination of completeness and correct specification or implementation of requirements from a **phase** (1.89) or **subphase** (1.128)

**1.138**

**verification review**

**verification** (1.137) activity to ensure that the result of a development activity fulfils the project requirements, or technical requirements, or both

NOTE 1 Individual requirements on verification reviews are given in specific clauses of individual parts of ISO 26262.

NOTE 2 The goal of verification reviews is technical correctness and completeness of the **item** (1.69) or **element** (1.32) with respect to use cases and **failure modes** (1.40).

EXAMPLE Technical **review** (1.98); **walk-through** (1.139); **inspection** (1.67).

**1.139**

**walk-through**

systematic examination of **work products** (1.142) in order to detect anomalies

NOTE 1 Walk-through is a means of **verification** (1.137).

NOTE 2 Walk-through differs from **testing** (1.134) in that it does not normally involve the operation of the associated **item** (1.69) or **element** (1.32).

NOTE 3 Any anomalies that are detected are usually addressed by rework, followed by a walk-through of the reworked work products.

EXAMPLE During a walk-through, the developer explains the work product step-by-step to one or more assessors. The objective is to create a common understanding of the work product and to identify any anomalies within the work product. Both **inspections** (1.67) and walk-throughs are types of peer **review** (1.98), where a walk-through is a less stringent form of peer review than an inspection.

**1.140**

**warning and degradation concept**

specification of how to alert the driver of potentially reduced functionality and of how to provide this reduced functionality to reach a **safe state** (1.102)

**1.141**

**well-trusted**

previously used without known **safety** (1.103) **anomalies** (1.2)

EXAMPLE Well-trusted design principle; well-trusted tool; well-trusted hardware **component** (1.15).

**1.142**

**work product**

result of one or more associated requirements of ISO 26262

NOTE A reference can be an independent document containing the complete information of a work product or a list of references to the complete information of a work product.

## 2 Abbreviated terms

ACC Adaptive Cruise Control

AEC Automotive Electronics Council



AIS	Abbreviated Injury Scale
ASIC	Application-Specific Integrated Circuit
ASIL	Automotive Safety Integrity Level (see definition 1.6)
BIST	Built-In Self-Test
CAN	Controller Area Network
CCF	Common Cause Failure (see definition 1.14)
COTS	Commercial Off The Shelf
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CRC	Cyclic Redundancy Check
DC	Diagnostic Coverage (see definition 1.25)
d.c.	Direct Current
DIA	Development Interface Agreement (see definition 1.24)
DSC	Dynamic Stability Control
ECU	Electronic Control Unit
EDC	Error Detection and Correction
E/E system	Electrical and/or Electronic system (see definition 1.31)
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference
ESD	Electrostatic Discharge
ESC	Electronic Stability Control
ETA	Event Tree Analysis
FPGA	Field Programmable Gate Array
FIT	Failures In Time
FMEA	Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
FTA	Fault Tree Analysis
HAZOP	HAZard and Operability analysis
HSI	Hardware-Software Interface
HW	Hardware
H&R	Hazard analysis and Risk assessment (see definition 1.58)
IC	Integrated Circuit
I/O	Input – Output
MC/DC	Modified Condition/Decision Coverage
MMU	Memory Management Unit
MPU	Memory Protection Unit

MUX	MUltipleXer
OS	Operating System
PLD	Programmable Logic Device
PMHF	Probabilistic Metric for random Hardware Failures
QM	Quality Management
RAM	Random Access Memory
ROM	Read Only Memory
RFQ	Request For Quotation
SIL	Safety Integrity Level
SOP	Start Of Production
SRS	System Requirements Specification
SW	Software
UML	Unified Modeling Language
V&V	Verification and Validation
XML	eXtensible Markup Language

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